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Key themes on political economy of reform  
of international corporate taxation  
 
 
 International corporate tax system is in need of fundamental reform 
 
 Many initiatives taking place in the European Commission and OECD 
 
 Only reform targeted at fundamental problems is the CCCTB  
 
o But unlikely to be implemented as it generates gainers and losers 
 
 A stable system needs to be incentive compatible – ie. countries would not 
have incentive to undermine it 
 
   
 
Outline 
 
 
1. Problems of the international corporate tax system 
 
2. Main reforms and reform proposals 
 
3. Transparency 
 
4. Co-ordination and competition 
 
5. Incentive compatibility 
 
   
1. Problems of the international corporate 
tax system 
 
 
 Active business profits are taxed in the source country (OECD Model Tax 
Convention Article 7)  
 
 Passive income is taxed in the residence country (OECD Model Tax 
Convention Articles 10(dividends), 11 (interest) and 12( royalties) ) 
 
 
And taxation of transfers governed by arm’s length principle  
 
 
 
   
Source v Residence 
 
Concepts date back to 1920s 
 
 But applied now to affiliates of multinational companies 
 
 Is residence of an affiliate a good place in principle to tax eg. royalty 
income? 
 
o OECD / Commission think not if there is no economic substance there  
 
 So revisit the basic principles 
 
 
 
   
Active v Passive income 
 
Is this distinction any longer a reasonable compromise?  
 
 Not if forms of income are easily manipulated 
 
 For example, treating debt and equity differently invites planning 
 
o Is there any good reason to treat them differently? 
 
o Is restricting interest relief to a proportion of earnings (as proposed by 
OECD) an appropriate response?  
 
 
 
   
Treating affiliated entities as independent 
 
Is the principle of treating affiliates of a multinational as independent any longer 
appropriate?  
 
 Principle seems an end in itself. 2 examples: 
 
o Can we allocate risk between affiliates?  
 
o Can a tax haven affiliate really finance activity elsewhere under a cost-
sharing arrangement? 
 
If the haven affiliate were independent, yes. But if not, then no. 
 
 
   
2. Main reforms and reform proposals 
 
 
1. European Commission 
 
June 2015:  
A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the EU: 5 Key Area for action 
 
 
2. OECD 
 
October 2015:  
BEPS project - reports on 15 Action Plans published 
 
   
A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the EU  
 
1. CCCTB 
 
2. Ensuring effective taxation where profits are generated 
 
3. Additional measures for better tax environment for business 
 
4. Further progress of tax transparency 
 
5. EU tools for coordination 
 
 
   
CCCTB 
 
Within EU, replace existing system completely 
 
 Single tax base for any company 
 Single calculation of EU-wide profit 
 Allocated to countries by a formula, based on location of capital, employment 
and sales 
 Each country taxes its share at its own rate 
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OECD BEPS Project 
 
 2 year programme, completed this month 
 15 Action Points, covering many aspects of international tax planning 
 
Essentially aiming to close “loopholes” in the existing,  
 
 Possible new principle introduced: tax in the place of economic substance 
 
o What is economic substance? 
o If a new principle, how does it relate to existing principles? 
o If not, and it is applied only in some circumstances, will that create further 
distortions and/or opportunities for planning?  
 
 
   
3. Transparency 
 
 
European Commission Tax Transparency Package, March 2015 
 
 Tax rulings 
 
 New transparency requirements for multinationals  
 
 Reviewing Code of Conduct on business taxation 
 
 Quantifying scale of tax evasion and avoidance 
 
 Repealing the savings directive 
 
 
   
Transparency on Tax Rulings 
 
October 6: Unanimous agreement by member states on automatic exchange of 
information on cross-border tax rulings 
- “An assurance that tax authorities give to taxpayers on how their tax will be 
calculated” 
 
Background 
 
 Commission investigations on possible infringement of State Aid rules 
o Ireland (Apple), Netherlands (Starbucks), Luxembourg (Fiat and Amazon) 
 Extended to all member states in December 2014 
  
 Also “Luxleaks”: information on 548 Luxembourg rulings on 340 companies 
leaked – some resulting in very low effective tax rates 
   
What is the value of exchange of rulings? 
 
Provide information to tax authorities in other member states, and to Commission  
 
 May identify possible areas of concern, and audit 
 May identify possible infringements of state aid rules 
 
 But limits to action that recipient tax authority can take, as must be compatible 
with EU law 
o eg. CFC rules can only be applied if arrangements in another member state 
are “wholly artificial” (Cadbury case) 
o Revision to parent-subsidiary directive required to make it easier to tax a 
dividend received from an EU affiliate that pays little tax 
 
 
   
Further Corporate Tax Transparency 
 
Commission objective: “move to a system on the basis of which the country where 
a business’ profits are generated is also the country of taxation” 
 Would “exposing enterprise to more intense scrutiny on the part of authorities 
or different stakeholders” contribute to objective? 
 Public consultation recently concluded 
 
OECD Action Plan 13 introduces a country-by-country report 
 Basic information on revenues, profit, employees, tax and other factors – on a 
consistent basis across countries 
 
   
What is the value of country-by country report? 
 
1. If disclosed only to tax authorities  
 
Similar to above 
 
Possibly of more value for combating avoidance involving a non-EU country, since 
not bound by EU law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2. If disclosed to general public  
 
Useful in broad statistical work – identifying the scale of BEPS, for example 
 
But not very useful in identifying whether a specific company has paid the “right” 
amount of tax 
 Any tax calculation is too complex to second guess on the basis of incomplete 
information 
 Should be very cautious in using such data to name and shame specific 
companies 
 
 
 
   
Political economy and transparency 
 
Hard to object to greater transparency 
 
But will it help much?  
 
 Will not address fundamental problems in tax system 
 
 May (at the margins) help to combat avoidance, but more easily outside the EU  
 
But an easier target for governments, Commission, OECD and NGOs 
 
 
 
   
4. Co-ordination v Competition between 
governments 
 
 
What do governments aim to achieve by competition? 
 
o Attract real economic activity? 
 
o Attract taxable profit? 
 
o Benefit domestic companies by generating competitive advantage? 
 
 
 
   
The UK example  
 
1. Reduction in tax rate from 28% to 20% - and soon to 18% 
 
2. Introduction of patent box to tax royalty income at rate of 10% 
 
3. Generous R&D tax credits 
 
4. Generous treatment of interest deductibility 
“The UK’s current interest rules, which do not significantly restrict relief for interest, 
are considered by businesses as a competitive advantage; other comparable 
countries tend to have more severe restrictions on such relief.” 
5. Generous Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules 
 
6. Introduction of Diverted Profits Tax 
   
Is tax competition ever good? 
 
All forms of tax competition aim to benefit one country at the expense of others  
 In terms of revenue, investment, etc  
 
“Harmful” tax competition rarely defined 
 
 Usually thought of special treatment of specific groups of taxpayers 
 
 This could upset the “level playing field” for competition between 
countries 
o But all tax competition can do this 
 
 
   
OECD BEPS Project 
 
Complex multi-dimensional game between members (and some non-members) 
 
o Not an exercise in identifying the global optimal tax system 
o Not surprising that the result is complex – and lacking much principle 
 
 
Outside EU, countries could already combat shifting profit to tax havens if they 
chose to 
o But doing so too much could compromise competitive position  
 
 
 
 
   
Commission’s agenda 
 
 Agreement between member states possible when stakes are low 
o Hence focus on transparency: losers will not lose much 
o (includes tax rulings, given state aid investigations) 
 
 Real reform, with gainers and losers much more difficult 
o CCCTB, FTT proposals 
 
  
   
5. Incentive compatibility 
 
International tax system can only be stable in the long run if there is no incentive 
for each country to impose externalities on others 
 
 Competition over rates, or anything else, that affects the location of activity, 
profit or revenue will affect other countries  
 
 Problem arises because we try to tax income in locations where it is most 
mobile, and fungible 
 
 In principle: levy tax on profit in location of less mobile activities or income 
 
o Points to taxation based on residence of, or consumption by, individuals 
o Why do countries not compete over VAT rates?  
